Over the last five years, European Union countries have been forced to adapt to unprecedented circumstances. They pulled together to purchase tens of millions of vaccines and devised an innovative debt financing scheme to resuscitate their COVID-19-ravaged economies.
After President Vladimir Putin ordered his troops into Ukraine three years ago, Russia restricted the flow of natural gas to weaken Western support for Kyiv. In response, the 27 EU nations weaned themselves off a dependency on Russian energy in record time.
Now, they face the challenge of ending their reliance on the United States to provide security.
In recent weeks, senior Trump administration officials have made clear that U.S. priorities lie elsewhere – in Asia and along America’s southern border – and that Europe should take care of itself, including Ukraine.
“For me, the absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that we can really achieve independence from the U.S. step by step,” Friedrich Merz, the likely next chancellor of Germany, told broadcaster ZDF after winning Sunday’s election.
“I never thought I would have to say such a thing on a television program,” Merz said, admitting surprise at apparent American indifference to the fate of Europe.
Despite being sidelined from Ukraine peace talks, he and other EU leaders appear determined to adapt to the new security realities. But it’s unclear whether they can drum up the military and financial resources, or muster the political will, to defend their interests.
Europe’s yawning security gap
NATO believes allies should spend at least 2% of gross domestic product on their defense budgets. Two EU heavyweights, Italy and Spain, do not come close. Nor do Belgium, Croatia, Luxembourg, Portugal and Slovenia.
NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte has said member countries probably should spend 3.5-3.7% to execute the alliance’s plans for defending Europe. Russia, Rutte worries, could be capable of mounting an attack on a European country by the end of the decade.
Those defense plans include U.S. participation. Without U.S. forces, the Bruegel think tank in Brussels estimates, Europe could need 300,000 troops and an annual spending hike of at least 250 billion euros ($262 billion) to deter Russia.
Bruegel said stopping a Russian advance might require 1,400 tanks, 2,000 infantry fighting vehicles and 700 artillery pieces. “This is more combat power than currently exists in the French, German, Italian and British land forces combined,” it said.
In Ukraine alone, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has called for 150,000 European troops to ensure the conflict doesn’t flare up again after a ceasefire, but Europe’s armies are too small. One proposal would see fewer than 30,000 European troops on the ground, backed by air and sea power. Finding even that many poses a challenge.
The funding predicament
Defense spending throughout Europe has gone up since Russia’s invasion began in earnest. Much is spent on weapons to keep Ukraine in the fight and back fill depleted European stocks, but demand is driving up prices.
Europe lacks military transport and logistics chains. Manpower shortages abound. The continent’s combined armies total around 2 million personnel but few can be effectively deployed. Talk of conscription is mounting.
To help address shortfalls, the European Commission is easing its fiscal rules so EU member countries can spend more on defense, at least temporarily. It’s not a magic bullet but could provide an incentive to boost military budgets.
It remains to be seen whether Merz will soften Germany’s opposition to EU defense bonds. As with Europe’s post-pandemic recovery, this would use joint borrowing to provide grants and low-interest loans. France, Italy, Poland and Spain already support defense bonds.
On March 19, the commission will unveil its “white paper” containing ideas for major military projects, ways to boost Europe’s defense industry, and how to fund it all.
Long term, the EU’s next seven-year budget will reorient spending toward security.
“The appetite to debate seriously the question of the defense capabilities of Europe is back,” EU Budget Commissioner Piotr Serafin said last week. But he warned that the impact of the new budget might only be felt in 2030, so any action on defense “should take place now.”
Political will, that rare European commodity
Finding money to adapt to the new security reality poses huge challenges. Also in short supply is the political courage and unity required to confront an adversary like Russia. Europe has relied on a U.S. security umbrella for decades and old habits die hard.
The EU “cannot become a truly regional and global actor without a relevant military dimension,” former EU Council President Herman Van Rompuy said in 2016, before Donald Trump became U.S. President for the first time.
Getting 27 countries to agree has never been easy, and more than eight years on, Europe is arguably at its weakest as the steady rise of a hard right that is often pro-Russian undermines the old order.
Merz may bring stability to Germany, even though the far right came second in elections there. But France’s latest government is fragile. Spain relies on small parties to keep its coalition intact, and the Dutch cabinet dominated by hard-right leader Geert Wilders is shaky.
Poland appears strong under Prime Minister Donald Tusk. However, a presidential election looms and a right-wing candidate is well placed. Belgium just got a new government after long months of wrangling.
Italy is probably most stable but also somewhat unpredictable, under Premier Georgia Meloni, whose ruling party has neo-fascist roots. Among smaller countries, Hungary and Slovakia have proved disruptive, undermining EU support for Ukraine.
Only a shared understanding of the security threat that Europe faces is likely to spark real action.
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Geir Moulson in Berlin and Raf Casert in Brussels contributed to this report.
