With Donald Trump’s return to power, transatlantic relations enter a time of turmoil and deep uncertainty. Political, economic and strategic challenges are closely intertwined. Europeans are striving to engage with the Trump administration and negotiate the terms of a new, more transactional transatlantic partnership. In the short term, key priorities include ensuring that President Trump’s push to end to the war in Ukraine does not leave Kyiv vulnerable to further Russian aggression, and preventing a trade war across the Atlantic. At the same time, Europeans worry that the Trump administration might exploit the continent’s reliance on the US as a security guarantor and economic partner to advance its own priorities. The alignment of interests and narratives between President Trump and Elon Musk has further heightened European concerns. Trump’s references to the US taking control of the Panama Canal and of Greenland, while downplaying Canada’s sovereignty, alongside Elon Musk’s proactive endorsement of the far-right in Europe, have raised alarms about the potentially destabilising impact of the new US administration on both international affairs and domestic politics.

‘America First’ is back

It remains unclear how these statements will translate into concrete policies, but Trump’s inaugural address offered some telling clues. The speech made no mention of US allies or partners, but delivered a stark message about America reclaiming “its rightful place as the greatest, most powerful, most respected nation on earth.”[1] The US was described as “a growing nation”, explicitly linking this growth to territorial expansion among other measures of success. President Trump boasted that he will “tariff and tax foreign countries to enrich [America’s] citizens” and reiterated his determination to end wars and avoid new ones –  calling himself “a peacemaker and a unifier” – while making no direct reference to the conflict in Ukraine.[2] President Trump’s immediate policy decisions upon taking office included withdrawing the US from the Paris Agreement on climate and from the World Health Organisation, and suspending all US development assistance programmes for 90 days.[3] Two weeks later, he imposed tariffs on Canada, Mexico and China, asserting that he would “absolutely” impose them on the European Union (EU) too.[4]

This forceful return to nationalism, protectionism and unilateralism suggests that security, trade and digital policies could become increasingly tangled and weaponized. In September 2024, Vice-President JD Vance commented on alleged attempts by the European Union (EU) to curb free speech on Elon Musk’s X network, subjecting it to EU regulations, and linked future NATO support to European respect for what he defined as American values and free speech. He noted that “American power comes with certain strings attached.”[5]

In the last few weeks, American Big Tech leaders have rallied behind Trump, echoing Musk’s opposition to EU rules affecting the interests of US companies.[6] Meanwhile, Scott Bessent, the new Treasury Secretary, and Stephen Miran, the nominee to chair the Council of Economic Advisers, have both argued that US security commitments should be calibrated depending not only on defence spending, but also on alignment with US economic priorities.[7] There is therefore growing concern among many in Europe that the US might make supporting European defence and decisions over tariffs contingent on concessions on trade and digital policy, and on complete alignment with President Trump’s stance on China.

How much leverage Washington will exert over Europe to shape, or force, the choices of European states, only time will tell. The question is how European countries and EU institutions will react to such possible tactics. Views among Europeans differ on many levels. First, opinions vary on how disruptive the Trump administration will prove to be for the transatlantic partnership. Some note that, during the first Trump administration, his rhetoric and threats ultimately proved manageable. Others believe that this time it is different, and that Trump’s second round in power will hit Europe’s interests hard. Second, Europeans are divided over how to respond if Washington moves forward with aggressive issue-linkage, as well as over what are the broader challenges and, for some, the opportunities, that the new administration entails for the continent. As Trump starts his second mandate, however, a preliminary mapping of Europe’s positioning vis-à-vis the new administration in the US is beginning to take shape.

Charting the map

This assessment builds on two fundamental dimensions that frame several factors affecting the future of the transatlantic relationship: security and values. These two dimensions are often conflated in public debates, but must be considered separately as they do not overlap. The former involves considerations related to Europe’s defence against military aggression and other direct forms of coercion by hostile powers. The latter concerns the values guiding different actors in Europe, and the importance of these values in defining their approach to the US under the new administration.

These are not the only dimensions that will influence Europe’s stance toward Trump and to the future of transatlantic relations, but they appear the most consequential at this stage. Russia’s war in Ukraine and hybrid campaigns against Europe pose a clear and present danger to the continent, making the question of Europe’s defence an urgent issue. At the same time, the political and normative contrast between Trump’s rhetoric and the liberal values that have traditionally underpinned the transatlantic partnership, carries potentially far-reaching implications across multiple policy fields, including security itself.

These two dimensions can be represented as two continuums. The first continuum stretches from the position of those who see Trump as an unreliable ally, or even a destabilizing force, to the position of those who believe that the new President will continue to back up Europe’s defence, albeit through a revised compact where allies carry much more of the burden. The second continuum runs from the position of those who think that, when dealing with President Trump, Europe cannot compromise on the liberal principles they endorse, to the approach of those in Europe who share the nationalist and populist discourse of the new US administration. Of course, various intermediate positions lie between these opposite views, along the two continuums. Unpacking the European debate on Trump’s priorities, their implications, and the future of the transatlantic partnership, helps to clarify the motivations and differences among various actors. The intersection of the security continuum and of the values continuum allows for an early mapping of Europe’s stance toward the new US administration.

Europe’s views on Trump: an early outline

This analysis presents three broad positions: the Pragmatists, the Normatives, and Trump’s Champions. These clusters are broad, encompassing actors with varying priorities and (particularly in the first two camps) diverse political leanings. The mapping seeks to reflect the political ‘sentiment’ across Europe about the new Trump administration and implications, which includes but is not limited to official positions. All European leaders are clearly pursuing engagement with the new administration in Washington and are striving to prevent fractures in transatlantic relations that would be detrimental to Europe. At this stage, therefore, statements by political figures and officials fall mainly within the Pragmatists camp and, for some, in the Champions’ camp. The broader European public debate reflects, however, deep concerns about the future of the transatlantic partnership, and EU-US relations in particular. This mapping exercise draws on a range of statements and analyses, which are clustered into three broad sets of propositions.[8]

The Pragmatists

Those in this large camp do not necessarily have much sympathy for President Trump’s politics, rhetoric, or attitude. Pragmatists, however, believe that Trump’s narratives and style are not the main problem for Europe. While Trump’s America and Europe harbour significant differences, that are likely to complicate cooperation in some areas, Europeans cannot afford letting these normative diatribes interfere with keeping the US engaged in Europe’s security. Europeans face a harsh world of multi-level competition and, as they brace for it, the US remains their best bet. Many Pragmatists tend to regard differences with the Trump administration as variations within a larger coalition of democracies. As Friedrich Merz, the conservative candidate running for Chancellor in the upcoming German elections, remarked in a recent foreign policy speech, the adversary is an axis of revisionist autocratic powers, including Russia and China, that are deepening their cooperation.[9] Some have also noted that Transatlantic cooperation might be facilitated by the current prominence of conservative forces in Europe.[10] Ultimately, the West remains the safest perimeter for Europe in a volatile world. As EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas recently reiterated, “The US is still our great ally.”[11]

Many Pragmatists believe that the foreign policy of the new US administration will be less disruptive than some fear. They expect, or hope, that, beyond the bravado, the Trump administration will recognise the fundamental strategic and economic interests linking the US and Europe, and that weakening the transatlantic bond would eventually weaken the US as well. It follows that the Europeans can make a convincing case for a renewed partnership, which centrally depends on confirming the American commitment to NATO and to Ukraine’s security. Doing so requires boosting Europe’s defence expenditure and readiness – a message that Prime Minister Tusk of Poland has often underscored.[12] NATO Secretary Generale Mark Rutte recently wrote on X that, with President Trump, “we will turbo-charge defence spending and production.”[13] It will also require deepening defence cooperation between the UK and its European partners, which will contribute to strengthening the European pillar of NATO. Concerning Ukraine, Europe should proactively work with the US through both NATO and the EU to help shape the peace deal that President Trump said he wants to achieve in the near term.[14] On balance, pragmatists endorse the idea that Europe must be empowered to navigate a geopolitical world and believe that joint efforts in Europe can help preserve the transatlantic alliance, proving that Europeans are prepared to take more responsibility for their defence.[15]

Dealing with a very assertive Washington, however, will also entail facing other US policy demands, including on trade and on China, while standing firm when the new administration challenges Europe’s economic interests. The European Commission has drawn up a package of measures to pave the way for constructive dialogue with the Trump administration.[16] Various members of the Commission have reiterated their readiness to cooperate with the US in the pursuit of mutual interests. In her recent speech in Davos, European Commission President Von der Leyen called for pragmatism and stressed her determination to engage and negotiate with the new leadership in Washinton. However, she also remarked that the EU will stand by its principles “to protect our interests and uphold our values” and that Europe has multiple options for cooperation with various global actors.[17]

The Normatives

The Normatives believe that the disconnect between President Trump’s worldview and priorities, and those supported by much of Europe, presents a structural challenge. In this definition, Normatives are not idealists, and appreciate the importance of pursuing engagement with the new US administration. However, they are concerned that political differences across the Atlantic will be consequential and potentially disruptive, not least because they aggravate divisions within the EU itself. Those in this camp stress that Trump’s nationalist and unilateralist narrative further undermines the multilateral architecture that the Europeans have long sought to strengthen, validating a world where might makes right. This stands in contrast to EU’s foundational principles, undermines cooperation on global challenges, such as climate change, and threatens Europe’s own interests and cohesion too.[18] Some warn that Trump’s ‘political contagion’ might jeopardize the EU’s very survival.[19] A continent of small to medium powers and relatively open market economies is highly vulnerable to the rise of protectionism and unmitigated great power competition.

Furthermore, the proximity between Trump’s political reflexes and those of many of his allies, for one, and the agendas of far-right forces in Europe, for another, risks emboldening the latter. While underscoring France’s alliance with the US, President Macron recently referred to Elon Musk as supporting “a new international reactionary movement.”[20] Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez accused the tech tycoons of using social media “to overthrow democracy.”[21] Emboldened illiberal forces could exacerbate political polarisation in Europe, weakening the legitimacy of the EU and potentially leading it to gridlock. A weaker, increasingly contested Europe in a world of power politics is, for Normatives, a major source of vulnerability to Europe’s stability, prosperity and security. The convergence between Trump’s unilateral, power-driven agenda and the economic interests of American Big Tech could also undermine the EU’s much-prized regulatory power – the ‘Brussels effect’.[22] 

Those in this camp are doubtful about the reliability of America’s commitment to European security under the new administration. Some warn that “Euro-American strategic intimacy” – a core asset of the Alliance – might become an early casualty of Trump’s return to power.[23] Such drift would weaken the credibility of US security guarantees to Europe, which essentially rely on trust. Even if the new US administration does not withdraw from NATO and strikes a deal with Russia that somehow upholds the security of Ukraine after a ceasefire, such guarantees remain essentially dependent on the mercurial personality of President Trump. Furthermore, guarantees could become conditional on pressure from Washinton on other policy areas, such as trade, digital markets regulation, or de-coupling from China. However, Normatives point out, simply aligning to Trump’s priorities would damage Europe’s economy, challenge Europe’s societal choices, and drastically shrink any ambition to advance Europe’s strategic autonomy. The reportedly very tense call between President Trump and Danish Prime Minister Frederiksen concerning Trump’s claims over Greenland has raised new questions across Europe about how far President Trump might go to assert his priorities.[24] Most Normatives support significantly investing in Europe’s defence and economic power base.[25] While seeking dialogue with Washington, however, they are not confident that strengthening Europe will help strengthen the transatlantic partnership, as the problem runs deeper. For them, empowering Europe is essentially aimed at weathering the storm that Trump might unleash, among many other strong global headwinds.

The Champions

President Trump’s European Champions are unfussed by his political agenda because they endorse it, in full or in part. The Champions are a diverse camp, not least when it comes to foreign policy, but they share Trump’s populist broadsides against liberal elites and intolerance of the constraints of rules-based institutions at the domestic and international level. They align with Trump’s narrative either out of conviction or out of convenience. They believe that Trump’s nationalist and illiberal discourse strengthens their own agendas relative to competitors, both in respective countries and in Brussels. Many of Trump’s European Champions aim to change Europe from within, weakening the supranational architecture of the EU, while re-asserting national sovereignty. The combined effect of their different strategies is to undermine a common foreign policy agenda at the EU level.[26] This aligns with Trump’s disdain for the EU as a rules-based international actor and economic power. On Trump’s inauguration day, Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban boasted, “The great attack can start. Hereby I launch the second phase of the offensive that aims to occupy Brussels.”[27] Shrewder nationalists, such as Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, have refrained from provocative statements and cultivated links with mainstream conservative forces in Europe. Some see her as a possible bridge between Europe and the new US administration.[28]

Many Champions are not particularly concerned about Trump’s impact on Europe’s security. Like for the new US administration, border protection and the fight against illegal migration rank at the top of their security priorities. While hard-right leaders from the Law and Justice Party in Poland and Italy’s Giorgia Meloni are Atlanticists, some Champions are clearly ambivalent about NATO’s current agenda, with a few even considering leaving the Alliance.[29] Many are sceptical, or outright opposed to, supporting Ukraine against Russia.[30] Relations with Russia remain a contentious issue among Trump’s Champions, but a large portion of them does not regard Russia as an adversary and clearly aims to improve relations with the Kremlin.[31] President Putin’s promotion of nationalist and illiberal values resonates with their own discourse in Europe. They see Trump’s return to power as lowering barriers to foster their relations with authoritarian regimes in Russia and elsewhere. There is no consensus among Trump’s Champions about relations with China either. Some are keen to deepen economic ties with Beijing, like in Hungary, and others are more cautious, given America’s rivalry with China, like in Italy. This issue, as well as American pressure to drastically raise defence spending in Europe or the introduction of tariffs on European exports, might complicate relations between this camp and the new administration in Washington. However, Champions bank on the fact that ideological affinity and personal connections with President Trump will afford them some flexibility.

A fluid map

In a highly volatile political context, the boundaries of the three clusters outlined here are far from fixed. The debate will unfold, and possibly take unexpected directions, depending on how President Trump’s objectives will translate into action, whether regarding a Ukraine peace deal or decisions over tariffs.[32] Additionally, various other factors must be considered. Unforeseen crises could, as always, disrupt the best laid plans and create new drivers of convergence or divergence across the Atlantic. Focusing on transatlantic relations, two main scenarios can be envisioned, which could lead to a reconfiguration of  these three clusters in the not so distant future.

If President Trump takes an uncompromising stance on Europe’s interests, and shows little regard for Europe’s security, the large Pragmatists camp might conceivably split in two clusters – the Boosters and the Barters. The former camp would share a lot of ground with the Normatives and merge with them. Boosters would conclude that the Trump administration is undermining the transatlantic partnership and NATO, and would call for enhancing Europe’s resources and sovereignty. Despite their differences, they would share the goal of making Europe much more resilient to pressures from any rival or competitor, and capable of defining and advancing its own priorities.[33] Those in the Barters camp would instead be prepared to pay a high political and economic price to preserve what is left of the transatlantic relationship. They would be primarily driven by the imperative to keep the US engaged in guaranteeing their security, whether through NATO or  bilateral agreements. This split would carry a significant risk of gridlock for the EU. Both the Boosters and the Barters might try to organise their cooperation, at least on some issues, through formats other than a politically fragmented EU.

Should the Trump administration adopt a more business-like attitude towards Europe, applying pressure to partners to eventually strike acceptable deals, or agree to disagree on some issues, while confirming America’s commitment to NATO and Ukraine’s security, the situation might look very different. Normatives would still contest key tenets of Trump’s worldview and lament that the new course in Washington would undermine multilateralism and challenge Europe’s preferences in areas such as the energy transition and digital regulation. However, they would not carry much traction, while the Pragmatists tent would likely grow even larger and the gap between this group and some of Trump’s Champions might narrow. Pragmatists could also soften their criticism of illiberal policies, avoiding friction with Trump. Under this scenario, NATO would do relatively well, and the EU would likely continue to operate in a ‘business-as-usual-plus’ mode, with a deeper cooperation on defence, economic security and key technologies. However, the ambition to advance Europe’s sovereignty would falter, as this objective would be subordinate to the goal of keeping President Trump on Europe’s side.

These two brief scenarios highlight a third dimension that, along security and values, might become critical to this mapping exercise, which concerns European sovereignty. On this axis, positions range from those who believe  that the only chance for Europe to survive great power competition is to empower the EU as a sovereign actor, to those who dismiss this ambition altogether. The latter view stems from different motivations, such as the imperative to seek shelter in the shadow of American primacy, or opposition to deeper European integration, or both. This dimension of the debate has emerged during the first Trump administration and has subsequently receded. Since 2022, close transatlantic cooperation to counter Russia’s aggression of Ukraine strengthened mutual trust and exposed Europe’s dependence on the US for its security.[34] Following Trump’s re-election, European leaders have been striving to minimise controversy and secure deals with the US on Ukraine, NATO and trade, to start with. If these efforts failed, however, the ‘sovereignty continuum’ would resurface as a very prominent dimension structuring the debate on transatlantic affairs and European integration.

Conclusion

President Trump’s return to power has, to put it mildly, focused minds in Europe. That is no surprise, given both his disruptive narrative and style, and the vital importance of the transatlantic partnership for Europe. It is precisely the depth of this partnership and the degree of Europe’s dependence on it for its security and prosperity that explains why Europeans are much more anxious than others about the ramifications of Trump’s re-election.[35] Besides, Trump’s worldview and priorities clash in many ways with the liberal tenets that have traditionally underpinned both the transatlantic alliance and EU integration. The viability of both NATO and the EU, and their identity as institutions founded on a shared set of values and interests, are at stake. However, much will depend on the actual balance between continuity and discontinuity in the US approach to Europe, and to international affairs at large, compared to earlier American administrations. At this point, any definitive conclusion would be premature, as assessments have varied over time, and expectations continue to differ.[36] What can be said at this early stage is that the first steps and messages of President Trump have certainly not reassured Europeans, and have challenged some of the assumptions of the Pragmatists camp.

The informal summit on European defence taking place on 3 February in Brussels gives EU leaders (joined by the Prime Minister of the UK and by the Secretary General of NATO) the first opportunity for an in-depth discussion on Trump’s potential impact on European security and on priorities for action. If one meeting cannot be expected to bridge the gaps in their perceptions and interests, it is essential that European leaders use the Brussels summit as a stepping stone to manage their differences and define shared goals.

This mapping of Europe’s views on President Trump’s posture inevitably involves some generalisations. For example, most Pragmatists and Normatives agree that Europeans need to decisively invest in defence and technological innovation, while completing the EU single market and unleashing growth. They differ, however, on the level of ambition, governance mechanisms, and the degree of compromise with President Trump that Europe should consider, as well as on the prospects for a renewed transatlantic partnership. Among those sceptical of room for cooperation with President Trump, some emphasise underlying normative gaps, while others focus on sheer interests, and on how they may be diverging across the Atlantic on important issues. Besides, some of the Champions may grow less fond of President Trump, if his specific demands and international economic agenda damage growth in their respective countries. That said, the clusters sketched out here offer a broad picture of how Europeans assess the implications of Trump’s re-election for Europe and transatlantic affairs at the beginning of 2025. This map will undoubtedly evolve, and President Trump’s policy on the war in Ukraine and Russia will be an early, critical test for the future of transatlantic relations.

[1] Melissa Quinn and Caitlin Yilek, ‘Read the full transcript of Trump’s inauguration speech’, CBS News, 20 January 2025, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-trump-inauguration-speech-2025/.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Robbie Gramer, Nahal Toosi and Eric Bazail-Eimil, ‘State Department issues immediate, wide-spread pause to foreign  aid’, Politico, 24, January 2025, https://www.politico.com/news/2025/01/24/state-department-foreign-aid-pause-00200510.

[4] Seb Starcevic and Giselle Ruhiyyih Ewing, ‘Trump vows to launch trade war on EU’, Politico, 1 February 2025.

[5] Gustaf Kilander, ‘JD Vance says US could drop support for NATO if Europe tries to regulate Elon Musk’s Platforms’, The Independent, 17 September 2024, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/jd-vance-elon-musk-x-twitter-donald-trump-b2614525.html.

[6] Aitor Hernández-Morales, ‘Zuckerberg urges Trump to stop the EU from fining US tech companies’, Politico, 11 January 2025, https://www.politico.eu/article/zuckerberg-urges-trump-to-stop-eu-from-screwing-with-fining-us-tech-companies/.

[7] Sam Sutton, ‘Why Stephen Miran thinks tariffs can work’, Politico, 6 January 2025, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-money/2025/01/06/why-stephen-miran-thinks-tariffs-can-work-00196532, and Scott Bessent, ‘A Trump adviser on how the international economic system should change’, The Economist, 23 October 2024, https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2024/10/23/the-international-economic-system-needs-a-readjustment-writes-scott-bessent.

[8] The positions of the leaders or authors mentioned in this assessment do not necessarily match in full the corresponding groups’ descriptions. Some of them may straddle different groups. However, their statements and insights inform the definition of the three camps in this mapping exercise.

[9] Pierre Mennerat, ‘L’Europe après Donald Trump selon Friederich Merz’, Le Grand Continent, 24 January 2025, https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2025/01/24/leurope-apres-donald-trump-selon-friedrich-merz/.

[10] Federico Ottavio Reho, ‘Trump II and Europe’s (centre-)right’, Blog, Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, 15 November 2024, https://www.martenscentre.eu/blog/trump-ii-and-europes-centre-right/.

[11] Philippe Jacqué, ‘Kaja Kallas, EU High Representative : ‘The US is still our great ally’’, Le Monde, 9 January 2025, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/01/09/kaja-kallas-eu-high-representative-the-us-is-still-our-great-ally_6736878_4.html.

[12] Alexandra Bzozowski, ‘Poland’s sales pitch to Trump: spend, invest and defend’, Euractiv, 20 January 2025, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/polands-sales-pitch-to-trump-spend-invest-and-defend/.

[13] Mentioned in Andy Bounds, Laura Dubois, Ben hall and Laura Pitel, ‘Ursula von der Leyen warns of fracturing global economy after Trump tariff threat’, Financial Times, 21 January 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/0d3be29f-db87-4496-9501-686f1a10f515.

[14] Luis Simón and Lotje Boswinkel, ‘Ukraine, Europe and the Art of the Deal’, War On The Rocks, 8 November 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/11/ukraine-europe-and-the-art-of-the-deal/.

[15] Pierre Mennerat, op. cit.

[16] See the main measures as reported in Noah Barkin and Agatha Kraz, ‘Trump and the Europe-US-China triangle’, Rhodium Group, 16 January 2025, https://rhg.com/research/trump-and-the-europe-us-china-triangle/.

[17] ‘Special Address by President von der Leyen at the World Economic Forum’, European Commission, 21 January 2025, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_25_285.

[18] Fabian Zuleeg and Janis Emmanouilidis, ‘Europe’s next watershed – how liberal Europe should react to Trump 2.0’, Discussion Paper, European Policy Centre, 9 January 2025, https://epc.eu/en/publications/Europes-next-watershed-how-liberal-Europe-should-react-to-Trump-20~6084fc.

[19] Heather Grabbe and Jean Pisani-Ferry, ‘Political contagion in Europe: can the European Union survive Trumpism?’, Bruegel, 16 January 2025, https://www.bruegel.org/first-glance/political-contagion-europe-can-european-union-survive-trumpism.

[20] Clea Caulcutt, ‘Macron says Musk is backing a ‘new international reactionary movement’, Politico, 6 January, https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-elon-musk-new-international-reactionary-movement/.

[21] Aitor Hernández-Moraes and Sarah Wheaton, ‘Tech billionaires want to ‘overthrow democracy’ with social media, Spain PM Sánchez says’, Politico, 22 January 2025, https://www.politico.eu/article/spain-pedro-sanchez-big-tech-billionaires-democracy-social-media/.

[22] Marietje Schaake, ‘Europe’s ‘super-regulator’ role is under threat’, Financial Times, 16 January 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/ce0d64b5-192e-48ae-a219-041874b580f2. 

[23] François Heisbourg, ‘Planning for a Post-American Europe’, Survival, vol.66, no.3, June-July 2024, pp. 7-20, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/survival-online/2024/06/planning-for-a-post-american-europe/.

[24] Richard Milne, Gideon Rachman and James Politi, ‘Donald Trump in fiery call with Denmark’s Prime Minister over Greenland’, Financial Times, 24 January 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/ace02a6f-3307-43f8-aac3-16b6646b60f6.

[25] Arancha González-Laya, Camille Grand, Katarzyna Pisarska, Nathalie Tocci and Guntram Wolff, ‘Trump-Proofing Europe. How the Continent Can Prepare For American Abandonment’, Foreign Affairs, 2 February 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/trump-proofing-europe.

[26] Rosa Balfour and Stefan Lehne (eds.), ‘Charting the Radical Rights’ Influence on EU Foreign Policy’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/04/charting-the-radical-rights-influence-on-eu-foreign-policy?center=europe&lang=en.

[27] Jennifer Rankin, Angela Giuffrida, Angelique Chrisafis and Deborah Cole, ‘ Trump’s presidency will help to ‘occupy Brussels’, says Orbán’, The Guardian, 20 January 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jan/20/trump-presidency-rightwing-europe-viktor-orban-far-right-us-inauguration.

[28] Charlemagne, ‘Will Giorgia Meloni turn out to be Europe’s Trump card?’, The Economist, 5 December 2024, https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/12/05/will-giorgia-meloni-turn-out-to-be-europes-trump-card.

[29] Agence France Press, ‘German far-right leader questions NATO membership’, Voice of America, 15 December 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/german-far-right-leader-questions-nato-membership-/7901894.html.

[30] See for example Stuart Lau, ‘Hungary flirts with Putin and snubs NATO meeting’, Politico, 20 October 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-viktor-orban-flirts-vladimir-putin-snubs-nato-meeting/, and Natasha Lindstaedt, ‘European populists back Putin as they roll out their anti-Ukraine positions’, The Conversation, 14 June 2024, https://theconversation.com/european-populists-back-putin-as-they-roll-out-their-anti-ukraine-positions-232301.

[31] Max Becker and Nicolai von Ondarza, ‘Geostrategy from the far-right’, SWP Comment No.8, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2024, https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2024C08/.

[32] Olivier Schmitt, ‘La tenaille de Trump: l’Europe gace à un risque existentiel’, Le Grand Continent, 18 November 2025, https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2024/11/18/dans-la-tenaille-le-piege-de-trump-a-leurope/.

[33] Sven Biscop, ‘2025: Is Europe Ready for the Old Normal?’, Commentary, Egmont Institute, 20 January 2025, https://www.egmontinstitute.be/2025-is-europe-ready-for-the-old-normal/; Arancha González-Laya, Camille Grand, Katarzyna Pisarska, Nathalie Tocci and Guntram Wolff, ‘Can American Abandonment Help Europe? The Continent Has a Chance to Address its Own Weakness’, Foreign Affairs, 6 January 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/can-american-abandonment-help-europe;  Giovanni Grevi, ‘Power for Progress: Why the EU Needs a New Global Strategy’, Policy Brief 22/2024, Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy, 22 July 2024, https://csds.vub.be/publication/power-for-progress-why-the-eu-needs-a-new-eu-global-strategy/.

[34] Giovanni Grevi, ‘Shockwaves: How Does the War in Ukraine Impact the EU’s Grand Strategy?’, In-Depth paper 05/2023, Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy, March 2023, https://csds.vub.be/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/CSDS-In-Depth-5-Shockwaves-March-2023.pdf.

[35] Timothy Garton Ash, Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, ‘Alone in a Trumpian world: the EU and global public opinion after the US elections’, Policy Brief, European Council on Foreign Relations, 15 January 2025, https://ecfr.eu/publication/alone-in-a-trumpian-world-the-eu-and-global-public-opinion-after-the-us-elections/.

[36] See, among several recent assessments, Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage, ‘Trump’s Threat to Europe. His First Term Tested the Transatlantic Relationship – but His Second Would Break it’, Foreign Affairs, 22 March 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/trumps-threat-europe; Charlie Laderman, ‘With Trump’s Return, the Transatlantic ‘Great Debate’ Resumes’, Survival, Vol.66, no. 6, December 2024-January 2025, pp. 7-16,  https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/survival-online/2024/11/with-trumps-return–the-transatlantic–great-debate-resumes/; and Richard Fontaine, ‘The Trump-Biden-Trump Foreign Policy. American Strategy’s Strange Continuity’, Foreign Affairs, 20 January 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/trump-biden-trump-foreign-policy.